


Roles of engagement in a digital conflict

TEFLONRABBIT ARTICLE No.253

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


The illusion of an ongoing conflict between the corrupt and the inept.

Tuesday, October 3, 2023 - 14:49


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Aroma



99

Rumness



99

Subscription Only
Off

With the recent passing of the Online Safety Act 2023, the UK has aligned itself with totalitarian regimes when it comes to policing their populations use of the internet. The only countries with more invasive policies are not considered as democracies. However the far reaching regulatory moves have a hidden agenda.

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After five years of political wrangling, the labyrinth of Westminster have finally signed off on the latest legislation in their war on the internet. In fairness many of the policies appear to have a sound basis for inclusion. The issues of child safety seem to form the lions share of the amendments and introductions. There has of course been the usual tournament of politico can kicking, but overall it presents as a credible piece of legislature.

But of course that's exactly what it's supposed to look like. Within the endless legalese of every bill ever passed are details which have been designed for flagrant abuse of power. This is what the apparatchiks and policy scribbling pharisees of national government do, identify the perception of risk and then mercilessly exploit it for the acquisition of yet more unwarranted influence. Ensconced among the articles and sections are ambiguous statements which essentially create busy work, scope for meddling and entire careers. Disguised as doing good for the next generations of digitally active citizens, these statements are in fact nothing to do with safety. In fact depending on the interpretation they arguably do more harm than good.

180 False communications offence

(1) A person commits an offence if—

(a) the person sends a message (see section 183),

(b) the message conveys information that the person knows to be false,

(c) at the time of sending it, the person intended the message, or the information in it, to cause non-trivial psychological or physical harm to a likely audience, and

(d) the person has no reasonable excuse for sending the message.

The broad scope of section 180 is justified as a framework to tackle online harassment. Indeed sending people false emails or SMS messages can cause undue distress and could well be considered highly offensive. It does seem unenforceable though when one considers how many practical jokes are delivered via digital methods. If the usual suspect Mr. X sends his football chums a group email stating that he has renounced all things football in favour of Unihoc, changed his name to Ms. Y and intends to compete in the international, pre-op, trans Unihoc league, according to this legislation he is committing an offence. Taste aside it could be considered that any fines levied upon Mr. X would be infringing on his god given right to prank his colleagues with an entirely frivolous piece of bawdy comedy material.

It gets worse;

181 Exemptions from offence under section 180

(1) A recognised news publisher cannot commit an offence under section 180.

(2) An offence under section 180 cannot be committed by the holder of a licence under the Broadcasting Act 1990 or 1996 in connection with anything done under the authority of the licence.

So, according to this exemption, it's fine for the BBC, Sky News, The Guardian or the Rendlesham Gazette to run an entirely fraudulent story. For example a sternly worded editorial piece that due to concerns of widespread toxic masculinity, all male football enthusiasts are required to present themselves to their GP surgeries for sports realignment therapy - with immediate effect. As the NHS is now more under the control of the W.H.O than it is the British Government, the originators of this crass disinformation (probably Reuters) need only make their agenda known to their commercial partners within the myriad of big pharma NHS suppliers. Without any oversight whatsoever in this grotesque assault on the male population, suddenly there is a belief among the majority of the population that football is bad, Unihoc is good and men need to be controlled by faceless media bureaucrats. While this example may sound ridiculous, it's not as ridiculous as saying that Facebook users have to tell the truth unless they're posting for a news company.

189 Sharing or threatening to share intimate photograph or film

In the Sexual Offences Act 2003, after section 66A (inserted by section 188), insert—

“66B Sharing or threatening to share intimate photograph or film

(1) A person (A) commits an offence if—

(a) A intentionally shares a photograph or film which shows, or appears to show, another person (B) in an intimate state,

(b) B does not consent to the sharing of the photograph or film, and

(c) A does not reasonably believe that B consents.

This all seems perfectly reasonable and is in line with many acts passed by other nations to clamp down on posting of so called 'Revenge Porn'. In fairness the deliberate release of sexual content which was obtained during an intimate encounter is quite likely to cause undue distress to women. Most men wouldn't consider it particularly compromising due to the variances in social conditioning - she's a whore, I'm a stud etc. etc. Exactly how the trans Unihoc league would feel about it is hard to know, but they'd probably feign outrage regardless. However it is once again, in the exemptions where the frankly bizarre logic employed comes to light:

66C Sharing or threatening to share intimate photograph or film: exemptions

(1) A person (A) who shares a photograph or film which shows, or appears to show, another person (B) in an intimate state does not commit an offence under section 66B(1), (2) or (3) if—

(a) the photograph or film was taken in a place to which the public or a section of the public had or were permitted to have access (whether on payment or otherwise),

(b) B had no reasonable expectation of privacy from the photograph or film being taken, and

(c) B was, or A reasonably believes that B was, in the intimate state voluntarily.

What this means in real terms is that it's ok to post revenge porn if you had sex in a public place. This includes deserted beaches, so that's basically tough shit for any *Shirley Valentines* out there. It also includes the woods, graveyards, pedalos out at sea and motor vehicles parked on carriageways or in public car parks. So that's even more tough shit for Pagans, Luciferians, sun worshippers, cottagers and doggers. In defence of the act, these minorities are fairly deranged anyway so it probably serves them right. Hopefully it will discourage them from *getting their freak on* where any upstanding Brits may take umbridge. Again, this sounds like a tacky blue comedy routine, but the preposterous nature of what is being made into law can not be understated. If 'Revenge Porn' is bad, which many women agree that it is, then why would it make any difference where it's filmed? The answer is most likely as a result of complications with surveillance legislation.

It is not an offence to film someone without their consent in a public place. The subject does not own the photons bouncing off their person. This means that anyone can be the subject of surveillance if they are in an area with public access. If they are being monitored while in a private area, the management of the area have the right to conduct this surveillance as long as they offer an opt out by way of their terms and conditions. In reality, this is manifested as people transferring from public areas into private areas without realising the difference. This is most notable in the City of London and Canary Wharf. Neither of which are public property. The discreet plaques mounted in difficult to see locations specify that they are private premises *with public access*.

As usual the nitty gritty of this highly elaborate legal snafu boils down to finances. CCTV footage is an instrumental facet of the 'big data' resource, as is the recording of telephone conversations. While many (including ill advised civil servants) believe that a caller must obtain permission to record the conversation, this is utter nonsense. The law is quite clear on the fact that anyone whomever may record any and all telephone calls they ever have or ever receive. The issue arises if they attempt to monetise the resource. This is why all government departments and commercial entities (it's increasingly hard to tell the difference) must include the obligatory disclaimer advising that "*calls may be recorded for training... blah blah blah*". They don't do it to protect their users from the incompetence of the call handler, they do it to indemnify themselves when they retail the information, voiceprints and linguistic data. The fact that they didn't pay the caller for this data is irrelevant. As is the data acquired when Mr. X scurries across the Citywatch monitored main road, darts into the Serco monitored Nags Head and convinces his Subbutteo cohorts that it's all over because he's decided that Unihoc is the best thing since sliced bread.

Unfortunately this is where the comedy hour ends and the bad aftertaste kicks in;

214 Offence under the Obscene Publications Act 1959: OFCOM defence

(1) Section 2 of the Obscene Publications Act 1959 (prohibition of publication of obscene matter) is amended in accordance with subsections (2) and (3).

(2) After subsection (5) insert—

“(5A) A person shall not be convicted of an offence against this section of the publication of an obscene article if the person proves that—

(a) at the time of the offence charged, the person was a member of OFCOM, employed or engaged by OFCOM, or assisting OFCOM in the exercise of any of their online safety functions (within the meaning of section 236 of the Online Safety Act 2023), and

(b) the person published the article for the purposes of OFCOM's exercise of any of those functions.”

This section is intended to read in such a way as to protect OFCOM staff from prosecution when they are preparing reports regarding obscene content. This would generally be interpreted as the most vile of digital content pertaining to the exploitation of minors. It is to be expected that employees of a government watchdog should not be held accountable for the handling or transmission of such material simply because they are reporting it. However therein lies a major complication.

117 Intelligence service information

(1) OFCOM may not disclose information received (directly or indirectly) from, or that relates to, an intelligence service unless the intelligence service consents to the disclosure.

(2) If OFCOM have disclosed information described in subsection (1) to a person, the person must not further disclose the information unless the intelligence service consents to the disclosure.

(3) If OFCOM would contravene subsection (1) by publishing in its entirety—

(a) a statement required to be published by section 47(5), or (b) a report mentioned in section 165(5), OFCOM must, before publication, remove or obscure the information which by reason of subsection (1) they must not disclose.

(4) In this section—

“information” means information held by OFCOM in connection with an online safety matter;

“intelligence service” means—

(a) the Security Service,

(b) the Secret Intelligence Service, or

(c) the Government Communications Headquarters.

In brief, this caveat ridden, hierarchical mish mash alludes to the fact that OFCOM can (and undoubtedly will be) be over ruled by MI5, MI6 or GCHQ. This is justified through terminology such as '*in the interests of national security*' and '*compromising ongoing operations*' and so forth. Unfortunately this is open to wide scale abuse by the aforementioned agencies. Due to their incessant compartmentalisation, there are frequent conflicts between investigative teams. This has come to light in cases pursued by independent legal bodies such as Liberty International. In essence it means that any of these agencies and also agencies with RIPA powers, can and do permit their agents and informants to break the law while engaged in their duties of obtaining intelligence. To cut straight to the chase this means that external and unaccountable assets are allowed to handle and exchange highly obscene content without prosecution. This is a problem, not only in terms of legal malfeasance but also in terms of the status quo it has created among the incalculable numbers of disposable assets. As covered in the article [Cisnormativity, Cisgender privilege & all out Terf wars](#) leverage among the clandestine community is now heavily focused on exposure to and consumption of obscene material. In addition the implication of the exploitation of minors has become the bread and butter of the industry. This so called 'Safety' act represents yet another consolidation of this highly disturbing practice. These organisations are considered 'essential blue light services' and much of what they do on a day to day basis could only be considered as inhabiting a profoundly concerning strata of societal dysfunction. To believe that any part of the RIPA diaspora are incapable of 'creative marketing' would be exceedingly naive.

According to the GOV.UK guide to the Online Safety Act;

In the most extreme cases, with the agreement of the courts, Ofcom will be able to require payment providers, advertisers and internet service providers to stop working with a site, preventing it from generating money or being accessed from the UK.

This would again, be intended to refer to children's safety. However major sections of the act also make reference to so called 'terrorism'. This includes information which could be of use to terrorists. This is a highly ambiguous definition and appears to be entirely at the discretion of the investigative powers and their associated representatives in the HM Courts service. For instance it could be said that much of the information contained on 192.com could be of use to terrorists. Likewise supply chain information, reservoir locations, public transport timetables, critical infrastructure details and real time traffic reports could all be considered useful to those seeking to bring distress and or disruption to the British public. This legislation gives OFCOM the scope to prevent any information provider operating outside of GDPR from providing this information and also the ability to fine them up to 18 million pounds. This is highly concerning as these providers are generally not in the business of facilitating acts of terrorism. Nonetheless should commercial / political interests decide that a foreign owned competitor should be prevented from carrying such information, they have the powers to enact it almost immediately and bring punitive financial measures. This provides yet more scope for legal powers to be co-opted in the

interests of commercial gain. That is and always will be a hallmark of what is literally defined as fascism.

All in all, the internet and the use of it continues to evolve at a phenomenal rate. Consequently the Online Safety Act 2023 can only ever be considered as a work in progress, not a diamond studded total solution to all of Britain's digital woes.